Child Custody Disputes: What Every Parent Needs to Know — and What You Won't Escape

This article will be read by parents who are at the start of something they never wanted. Or in the middle of it and struggling to breathe. Or who have been through the court and want to understand why it ended the way it did.

The same applies to all of them: a dispute over children is not an ordinary civil case in which the court divides rights between two adults. In custody proceedings, the central figure is the child. Almost everything else follows from that.

Anyone who goes to court expecting it to confirm at last who was the worse partner is usually mistaken. Even at the divorce stage itself, it becomes clear that the choice between agreement and a fight shapes what the proceedings about the children will look like. Constitutional Court case law from recent months keeps repeating that the court's task is mainly to deal with:

• what is in the best interests of the child,
• which arrangement is stable, safe and workable for the child,
• what the child really thinks and experiences,
• and whether the parents are using the dispute over the child to continue their dispute with each other.

Here are ten things every parent who is entering custody proceedings, or considering it, should know.

¶ 1. You are not entitled to "half of the child". The court does not have to set 50:50 care.

This is usually the first big surprise. The key decision is Constitutional Court finding file no. I. ÚS 3718/25 of 30 March 2026 (a finding, or nález, is a ruling on the merits of a constitutional complaint; an order, or usnesení, typically disposes of a complaint without such a ruling). According to it, equal-time care is not the default. The court should not automatically start from a 50:50 model and only then look for reasons why it would not work.

On the contrary:

• the primary consideration is always the best interests of the child,
• the care of both parents can be asymmetrical,
• the equal value of both parental roles does not mean the same number of days.

The Constitutional Court also pointed out that since the amendment in force from 1 January 2026, the court should not fix on labels such as "sole" or "alternating" custody, but should set an appropriate extent of care for each parent. In July 2026 it developed this in finding file no. IV. ÚS 765/26: care "of equal value" is a matter of worth, "equally divided" care is purely a matter of quantity, and the two must not be confused. For an overview of the new rules, see What changed in Czech family law.

¶ 2. Want to change the existing arrangement? Long-standing disagreement with it is not enough.

The same finding, I. ÚS 3718/25, is important in another respect. If there is already a final decision or an approved agreement on care, a change will not come simply because one parent thinks things should now be different. There has to be a change in circumstances.

The Constitutional Court stressed that:

• changing the existing care arrangement requires a relevant change in circumstances,
• the amendment in force from 1 January 2026 does not by itself "reopen" old decisions,
• the court assesses whether the change is necessary to protect the best interests of the child.

¶ 3. The best interests of the child are at the centre of everything. Your wounded sense of justice is not.

In finding I. ÚS 3718/25 the Constitutional Court described the best interests of the child as a flexible and individual concept. It is not a stock phrase for the court to insert into a judgment. The court has to fill it with concrete content.

The court therefore weighs, among other things:

• the stability of the environment,
• social and educational ties,
• the need for continuity,
• the particular needs of the specific child,
• the child's view,
• and whether the proposed arrangement works in practice.

One more detail: the parents' mistakes and faults in their relationship with each other can play only a secondary role and do not outweigh the interests of the child.

¶ 4. Contact with the other parent is not automatic. But its absence is not the normal state either.

In order file no. I. ÚS 3672/25 of 17 March 2026, the Constitutional Court said something that is often oversimplified in practice: not every decision that does not order contact with the other parent is unconstitutional.

In other words:

• a parent's right to take part in the child's upbringing is not absolute,
• contact can be restricted, and exceptionally not ordered at all, if the best interests of the child require it,
• a legitimate reason can also be the clearly expressed wish of a child who is able to take a clear position.

A passive parent is in a considerably worse position. Actively trying to maintain or restore the relationship is part of parental responsibility.

¶ 5. The child's wishes carry weight. But this is not a family vote.

In order I. ÚS 3672/25 the Constitutional Court accepted that a clearly expressed wish of the child can be a reason for the court not to arrange contact the way a parent wants. Order file no. I. ÚS 2789/25 of 12 March 2026 shows that courts may rely on a child's long-held wish and, where circumstances change, adjust care accordingly.

¶ 6. A quick decision is not a shortcut to winning.

In order file no. IV. ÚS 1863/25 of 18 March 2026, the Constitutional Court restated the limits of interim measures in matters concerning children. An interim measure is only a temporary tool, and the proceedings on it do not allow the court to understand everything specific to the child. It therefore cannot replace thorough evidence-taking on the merits.

New rules have applied since January 2026. In matters of care and contact, the interim measure has been replaced by the provisional decision. The court may only issue it once all parties, including the child, have had the opportunity to respond to the application. It lasts no longer than three months. If proceedings on the merits are already under way, the court can extend it, up to six months in total, and beyond that only exceptionally. There is no appeal against the decision on the application. In summer 2026 the Constitutional Court twice found a breach of the rights of a parent to whom the court had not served the application in time and whom it had not given room to respond (findings file nos. I. ÚS 1382/26 and II. ÚS 1971/26). The reasoning of IV. ÚS 1863/25 continues to apply.

¶ 7. Preliminary enforceability must be genuinely justified.

In finding file no. III. ÚS 3700/25 of 5 February 2026, the Constitutional Court quashed decisions that, without persuasive reasoning, had declared preliminarily enforceable extensive, uninterrupted contact between a young child (three and a half years old) and a person other than a parent.

The court has to state:

• which specific circumstances were established,
• what serious or hard-to-remedy harm the child would face without immediate enforceability,
• and why this course of action is in the interests of the particular child.

The same finding makes one more point: where someone other than a parent is seeking contact, the court must first establish with certainty that the child has a genuine emotional bond with that person. An adult's good will is not enough.

¶ 8. Restrictions on contact must have a way forward.

Where a child faces a risk of violence, even a complete ban on contact with a parent can be proportionate. In order file no. I. ÚS 3588/25 of 25 February 2026, the Constitutional Court did not find unconstitutional a ban on contact with a father who was being prosecuted for violence against the children and their mother. At the same time, it pointed out that the longer such a measure lasts, the more serious the interference it represents, and the more carefully its continuation has to be justified.

Assisted contact is not meant to be a long-term solution. Its purpose is to calm strained relationships and allow safe contact, and to be extended when conditions permit. Stringing together quick interim measures is not the way to get there, though. In order file no. II. ÚS 191/26 of 13 February 2026, the Constitutional Court found no error in the courts' refusal to extend assisted contact by an interim measure when the proceedings on the merits were nearing their end and contact was taking place in the meantime. A final arrangement cannot be replaced by repeated interim measures. For a fuller discussion of protecting children from violence, see Domestic violence and the law.

¶ 9. Child support cannot appear out of thin air. The court has to show its calculation.

In disputes over children, child support is usually the second battlefield. The key decision here is Constitutional Court finding file no. III. ÚS 1952/25 of 12 February 2026.

In it, the Constitutional Court criticised the lower courts for setting child support in a way that could not be reviewed. It is not enough to state that the parents have some income and the child has some needs. The reasoning must make clear:

• which income and financial circumstances the court considered decisive,
• how the parents' standard of living is reflected in the child's standard of living,
• and how the court arrived at the specific amount.

Child support is the child's income and is not meant to compensate for the income of the parent providing care. It is meant to cover the child's needs and give the child a share in the parents' standard of living. And note: according to the Constitutional Court, child support cannot be automatically disregarded even in alternating care, where the parents share care equally. The court must set it so that it reflects the standard of living of both parents. On calculation and enforcement after the reform, I have written a separate article on child support.

¶ 10. In a dispute over a child, you do not have to be the one representing the child. Sometimes you are not allowed to be.

Where there may be a conflict of interest between a parent and the child, the parent cannot represent the child and the court appoints a guardian ad litem for the child (opatrovník, Section 892(3) of the Civil Code). The Constitutional Court does this routinely in its own proceedings too, for example by order file no. II. ÚS 611/26 of 18 March 2026.

Some parents take this personally: "How can someone else speak for my child?" The logic is simple, though. The child is a party to the proceedings, and the child's interests may differ from the parent's. That is why the child needs separate representation.

¶ What works in court and what doesn't

A summary in a table that clients often take a photo of:

¶ What you won't escape in a custody dispute

Without sugar-coating:

The hardest lesson lies elsewhere, though. A custody dispute is not a contest for moral victory. It is a test of who can translate their parenting into the language of the child's needs. Adults tend to find it uncomfortable precisely because nothing that worked in the war between partners works here.

If you are in the middle of such a dispute, do not deal with it alone. Turn to an attorney who specialises in family law, cooperate with OSPOD and try to see the situation through the child's eyes. That is the perspective courts are looking for most today.

¶ Case law cited

The texts of the decisions are available in the NALUS (Constitutional Court) database.

• Constitutional Court finding file no. I. ÚS 3718/25 of 30 March 2026
• Constitutional Court finding file no. IV. ÚS 765/26 of 28 July 2026
• Constitutional Court order file no. I. ÚS 3672/25 of 17 March 2026
• Constitutional Court order file no. I. ÚS 2789/25 of 12 March 2026
• Constitutional Court order file no. IV. ÚS 1863/25 of 18 March 2026
• Constitutional Court finding file no. I. ÚS 1382/26 of 2 July 2026
• Constitutional Court finding file no. II. ÚS 1971/26 of 31 August 2026
• Constitutional Court finding file no. III. ÚS 3700/25 of 5 February 2026
• Constitutional Court order file no. I. ÚS 3588/25 of 25 February 2026
• Constitutional Court order file no. II. ÚS 191/26 of 13 February 2026
• Constitutional Court finding file no. III. ÚS 1952/25 of 12 February 2026
• Constitutional Court order file no. II. ÚS 611/26 of 18 March 2026